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Experience-based decisions can be defined 
as decisions emanating from direct or 
vicarious reinforcements that were received 
in the past. Typically, in experience-based 
decision tasks an agent repeatedly makes 
choices and receives outcomes from the 
available alternatives, so that choices are 
based on past experiences, with no explicit 
description of the payoff distributions from 
which the outcomes are drawn. The study of 
experience-based decisions has long roots 
in the works of mathematical psychologists 
during the 1950s and 1960s of the last cen-
tury (e.g., Estes and Burke, 1953; Bush and 
Mosteller, 1955; Katz, 1964). This type of 
task has been viewed as a natural continu-
ation of the behaviorist tradition involving 
animals as subjects, and multiple trials in 
which feedback is obtained on each trial. 
During the 1970s and 1980s seminal stud-
ies focusing on choices among descriptive 
gambles began to dominate the field of 
Judgment and Decision Making, paving the 
wave for the successful and influential works 
of Tversky and Kahneman (e.g., Kahneman 
and Tversky, 1979). Indeed, a review of 
the decision making literature from 1970 
to 1998 conducted by Weber et al. (2004) 
shows prominent use of description-based 
tasks over experience-based tasks.
Yet the study of experience-based deci-
sions has continued to evolve. Some of the 
workers in this subfield were neuropsychol-
ogists who used experience-based tasks as 
a natural way to evaluate individual dif-
ferences owing to these tasks having many 
choice trials (e.g., Bechara et al., 1994). 
Others were interested in the complex rela-
tions between learning and decision making 
(Erev and Roth, 1998). An interesting find-
ing that has finally defined the importance 
of contrasting the two types of tasks – expe-
rience-based decisions and description-
based decisions, was obtained by Ido Erev 
and his colleagues. Kahneman and Tversky 
(1979) showed that individuals overweight 
small probability events in their decisions 
from description. For instance, in selecting 
between an alternative producing $3 for 
sure or a gamble producing 10% chance 
to receive $32 (and otherwise zero), most 
people pick the riskier alternative, behaving 
as if they give greater weight to the rela-
tively rare event (see Hau et al., 2009). Erev 
and colleagues have demonstrated a reverse 
phenomenon in decisions from experience 
(Barron and Erev, 2003; Hertwig et al., 
2004; Yechiam et al., 2005). People tend to 
experientially select alternatives as if what 
happens most of the time has more weight 
than the rare event. Thus, people overweight 
small probability events in decisions from 
description while underweighting them in 
decisions from experience. This has been 
referred to as the description–experience 
(D–E) gap (Hertwig et al., 2004). The stud-
ies exploring the D–E gap were followed by 
further investigations examining the diver-
gent and convergent processes in these task 
types (e.g., Rakow et al., 2008; Barron and 
Yechiam, 2009; Wu et al., 2011).
In parallel to the recent advancements 
in experience-based decisions within the 
field of Judgment and Decision Making, 
there have been numerous studies of this 
type of decisions in Neuroscience. For 
example, the feedback-based error-related 
negativity (fERN; see below; e.g., Gehring 
and Willoughby, 2002) and the role of 
non-declarative knowledge in select-
ing advantageously (Bechara et al., 1997) 
were found in experience-based decisions. 
Several studies have explicitly showed that 
that experience-based tasks result in higher 
correlation between studied brain variables 
and over behavior. For example, in Aharon 
et al.’s (2001) fMRI study, participant 
evaluated the attractiveness of face images 
either descriptively or by making choices 
and receiving feedback. Brain activation 
levels in the reward circuitry (particu-
larly, the nucleus accumbens) matched the 
evaluation patterns only in the experiential 
condition. Similarly, severe damage to the 
orbitofrontal cortex was found to lead to 
decision impairments in experience-based 
tasks, but not in description-based tasks 
(Leland and Grafman, 2005). Still, many 
of the investigations of these neuroscien-
tific aspects have borrowed their theoretical 
underpinning from the study of decisions 
from description, and have not been guided 
by relevant theories of experience-based 
decisions. At the same time, many of the 
decision making studies of experience-
based tasks have taken place without aware-
ness of the relevant brain studies using this 
paradigm.
In an attempt to highlight the necessity 
of integrating the two bodies of research 
(JDM and neuroscience studies), we pre-
sent three dissociations (or “gaps”) between 
brain activation patterns and behavioral 
choices in these tasks. The majority of this 
paper is devoted to describing the three 
gaps in order to encourage further research. 
Additionally, we also suggest some direc-
tions for exploring and explaining these 
inconsistencies.
Three brain-behavior gaps in 
experience-based decisions
brain acTivaTion and behavioral 
responses To rare evenTs
The very famous “oddball” paradigm exam-
ines people’s brain responses following 
low-probability events compared to more 
frequent events. The typical result is an ele-
vated fronto-central signal approximately 
300 ms following the rare event, which is 
known as P300. The original oddball para-
digm normally required a response follow-
ing the rare event, and thus confounded 
the rarity of the event and its performance 
requirements (Squires et al., 1975). Yet the 
same findings were also replicated in task-
irrelevant rare events (Debener et al., 2005) 
and in reward prediction tasks (Karis et al., 
1983). The elevated neural activation fol-
lowing the rare event appears to be incon-
sistent with the tendency to underweight 
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rare events in experience-based decisions. 
One might argue, though, that the depend-
ent variable in decision tasks (i.e., the choice 
proportion) is also affected by the size of 
the rare payoff, and this component may 
be insufficiently integrated upon mak-
ing choices. Still, this would be inconsist-
ent with the standard way in which the 
underweighting phenomenon is explained 
(Hertwig et al., 2004). Moreover, as we shall 
see below, inconsistency between brain acti-
vation and behavior also emerges when the 
target event (e.g., a loss) is similar in size to 
the control event (e.g., a gain).
brain acTivaTion and behavioral 
responses To losses
In a seminal EEG study, Gehring and 
Willoughby (2002) demonstrated that a 
large portion of the frontal cortex exhib-
its greater rapid activation following losses 
than following equivalent gains. This 
event-related brain potential (ERP) has 
been referred to as medial frontal negativ-
ity (MFN; Gehring and Willoughby, 2002) 
or fERN (Yeung and Sanfey, 2004). Gehring 
and Willoughby (2002) suggested that the 
existence of the increased cortical response 
following losses is consistent with the behav-
ioral principle of “loss aversion,” which 
denotes an increased subjective weight of 
losses compared to gains (Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1979). Furthermore, they argued 
Figure 1 | risk taking in two studies of experience-based decisions. Top: 
Ert and Yechiam (2010). Bottom: Yechiam and Telpaz (in press). Each task involves 
the selection among a Safe option (S) and a Risky option (R). The results show 
the mean proportion of selections from the risky alternative in each trial [P(R)] in 
different conditions. The participants take less risk over time when payoffs are 
predominantly gains or losses but not in mixed gains and losses.
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memory have been known to result in acti-
vation peaks approximately 600 ms after the 
relevant stimuli (Gunter et al., 2000) and 
even later (Tu et al., 2009). Still, while this 
is a possible interpretation for these gaps, 
it is quite tentative as the relevant delayed 
processes have not been uncovered.
An alternative suggestion is that the 
rapid fronto-central activation follow-
ing monetary outcomes does not repre-
sent “instant utility” weighting of these 
outcomes (as proposed, for instance, by 
Gehring and Willoughby, 2002). Possibly, 
it could represent an attentional phenom-
enon. We (Yechiam and Hochman, 2011; 
Yechiam and Telpaz, 2011) suggested that 
an encompassing increase in frontal acti-
vation may represent the intensity of the 
attentional orienting response. Attention 
may be drawn by losses for instance, and 
this may increase the overall investment of 
cognitive resources in the task, in a sym-
metric fashion to both gains and losses. A 
related explanation involves the surprise 
value of incentives (Nevo and Erev, 2011). 
Under these explanations, the noted gaps 
are accounted for by the assertion that brain 
activation to incentives may represent cog-
nitive processes that do not have a direct 
effect on the subjective valuation of the 
stimuli that have elicited them.
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(e.g., Erev et al., 2008) typically do not find reliable behavioral manifestations of loss aversion. The studies repor-
ted in Figure 1 replicate this pattern.
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